Industrial output and labour productivity in the Netherlands, 1913-1929 : some neglected issues by Jong, Herman de & Albers, Ronald
Industrial Output and  Labour Productivity in 
the Netherlands, 1913-1929: Some Neglected 
Issues 
Research Memorandum 574 (GD-13) 
Herman de Jong and Ronald Albers 
October 1994 Editors: 
Prof.& J.L. Bouma 
Prof.& W.K. Klein Haneveld 
Prof.& S.K. Kuipers 
Prof.& P.S.H. Leeflang 
Prof.& A. Maddison 
Prof.& J. Pen 
Prof.dr H-J.  Wagener 
Prof.dr T.  J. Wansbeek 
Memorandum from 
Institute of Economic Research* 
Faculty of Economics 
University of Groningen 
P.O. Box  800 
9700  AV  Groningen - The Netherlands 
tel. 31-50-633741 
fa.  3 1-50-637337 
Research memoranda of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre are published 
as a sub-series of the memorandum series of the Institute of Economic Research. INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND LABOUR PRODUCTrVITY IN 
THE NETHERLANDS, 19 13- 1929: SOME NEGLECTED ISSUES* 
H.J.  de Jong & R.M.  Albers 
1. Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  make  a  quantitative assessment  of  the  development  of 
manufacturing  in a period which  was  crucially important for Dutch  industry. This is  an 
abridged version of the more comprehensive Dutch text, which will appear in the 1994 issue 
of  the NEHA-Jaarboek. We here emphasize the quantitative results of our research, leaving 
out many details and references set out in the historiography. 
World War I is in many ways regarded as marking the end of the nineteenth century, 
a statement which is particularly appropriate for The Netherlands. The First World War has 
been  a  watershed  in  Dutch  historiography.  Most  economic  historical  studies  of  The 
Netherlands either take the 1920's as a starting point, or end at the eve of World War I. The 
lack of  quantitative studies on a period which in many respects can be considered a major 
turning-point in Dutch economic development is striking. This can partly be attributed to a 
lack of  quantitative data. The first industrial census was carried out in 1913. However, key 
economic figures gathered by  the Dutch bureau of statistics (CBS) only are available on an 
annual basis from  1921 onwards. As  far as industrial production  is concerned, the series 
solely pertain  to some industries.  The coverage of  the industrial production  surveys was 
extended to the whole of industry only after World War 11.  In our opinion, however, it is not 
so much  the lack of detail which is the gravest shortcoming in current historiography.  A 
consistent long term perspective is the most urgent requirement. We try to shed some light 
on  the  developments in  this  crucially  important period,  without  claiming to  provide  a 
comprehensive survey. 
According to recent estimates Dutch GNP increased at an annual rate of 3.6% between 
19  13 and 1929. This compares favourably to annual growth rates of  1.2%, 0.7%, and 3.1% 
in Germany, the UK, and the USA over the same period.' More striking still is the relatively 
rapid growth of domestic product per hour worked on a macro level. According to Maddison 
the growth rate for The Netherlands was 2.7%  annually, compared to 1.4%,  1.5%, and 2.4% 
for  Germany, the  UK,  and  the  USA,  re~~ectively.~  This makes  the  Dutch experience a 
potentially interesting case for international comparisons. In the present contribution, however, 
we  focus on production and productivity in manufacturing industry, and its impact on the 
economic development of The Netherlands between 1913 and 1929. We try to identify some 
of  the  driving  forces  behind  industrial  development  and  to  place  them  in  a  long-term 
perspective. Our calculations are all based on published sources (most important of which are 
the censuses of  production). It goes without saying that our analysis is conducted from the 
supply  side.  This  paper  is  arranged  as  follows.  First,  we  give  a  brief  review  of  the 
development of Dutch industry between  1913 and 1929. We then present our calculations of 
*  We are grateful to  Jan  Luurs  for his assistance with statistics and  graphs. This paper is based on research 
sponsored by the Foundation for Economic. Social, and Spatial Sciences (ESR), which is part  of the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). 
1  C.A. van Bochove & T.A. Huitker, Main national accounting series, 1900-1986.  CBS NA-017 (1987). 9. 
2  A. Maddison, Dynamic forces  in capitalist development: a  long-run comparative view (Oxford9New York, 
1991), 212-214. Maddison's figures for The Netherlands are based on Van Bochove & Huitker, 'National accounting'. value added and labour productivity and briefly discuss the results. In  our empirical work we 
restrict the analysis to a number of industries, representing about a fifth of total manufacturing 
industry, for which we have consistent data. Finally, we proceed to focus on two determinants 
of  output  and  productivity  which  have,  in  our  opinion,  played  a  crucial  role  in  the 
development of Dutch industry during and after World War I: the cut back in hours worked 
accompanied by a substantial real wage increase, and the rapid electrification. 
2. A brief description of the development of Dutch industry between 1913 and 1929 
At the eve of  the First World War, The Netherlands had witnessed a decade or so of rapid 
economic growth, with booming investment. Manufacturing industry was rapidly expanding, 
but in the small open economy of The Netherlands the services sector was most prominent. 
In manufacturing small and medium-sized firms were dominant. Many industries relied on 
imports for their  supplies of  raw  materials.  Therefore, the  outbreak of  the  war and  the 
subsequent decrease in foreign trade posed grave problems, especially for those industries 
which were wholly dependant on imports. Overseas trade was most seriously affected. The 
Dutch tried to secure large stocks of primary materials. Government and fums cooperated to 
set up  a system of  distribution and price  control^.^  The distribution of  coal was  of  vital 
importance to the economy. Despite a dramatic rise in  the  supply of  domestic coal fuel 
shortages were  a major  problem  until  1920. Distribution  was  also extended to the most 
important foodstuffs. Coupled with rigid price-controls this meant the rise in nominal wages 
could be limited, although real wages dropped dramatically because other prices increaser 
rapidly. 
It is difficult to give a balanced account of the development of Dutch manufacturin; 
during the first World War, since circumstances could vary dramatically between industries. 
In general, after serious disruption in  the first months following the outbreak of  the wa 
industry adapted rather quickly to the changing conditions. Adverse circumstances did by n 
means cripple Dutch industry, although, it must again be stressed, differences between vario~ 
industries could be very important. In the first years of  the war there was  no widesprcz 
shortage of  raw materials. The virtual cessation of  trade in numerous products meant th 
foreign competition was ruled out in many industries, This was of course a powerful stimul 
for import  substitution. This resulted in  changes in the composition and  structure of  t' 
secondary sector and  the  establishment  of  many  new  industries (such  as  rubber).  The 
structural changes had a very significant long term impact. Until 1916 industrial output, pric 
for industrial products, and employment all showed a marked increase. Because of low rc 
wages  and  a  relatively  low  interest  rate  profits  were  excessively  high.  Consequent 
investment did also boom, resulting in a sharp increase in production capacity (table 11.' 
3  H.A.R. Smidt, 'De  regulering van de Nederlandse export van landbouwprodukten naar Duitsland tijdel 
Eerste Wereldoorlog', Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 54 (1991) 102-133. 
4  Good contemporary introductions to the economic history of The Netherlands in  World War I in Er 
are:  The Netherlands and  the  World War Volume I, I1  (New Haven,  1928) and B.F. Moore. Ecor 
aspects of  the commerce and indusrry of  the Netherlands, 1912-1918 (Washington 1919). 
5  These calculations  have  a  large  margin  of error,  since they  were  based  on rough estimates  of 
production of machinery plus net imports of capital goods. Table  1  Gross investment in  fixed assets, excluding buildings  1913-1919. 
Gross investment (mln fl 
(current prices)  185  174  160  223  185  257  498 
Gross investment (mln f) 
(constant prices of 191 3)  185  177  167  20  1  110  93  136 
Index of investment in 
constant prices (1913=100)  100  96  90  I09  59  50  74 
Sources:  Nederlandsche volkshuishouding, 1914-1918,5,23;  Ongevallenstatistiek, 1913;  Statistiek van 
voortbrenging en verbruik. 19  13. 
Deflation by a price index consisting of engineering wages (weight 0.4) and iron prices (weight 0.6). 
Shortages of raw materials and machinery and spare parts from abroad probably limited the 
growth of the industrial capital stock. High investment in industry was partly the result of  a 
shift in  the  policies  of  banks  and  private  investors. With  many  of  the  more  traditional 
investments abroad becoming  increasingly insecure, funds were diverted  to the  industrial 
sector. The turning point came in  1917. Because of  the increasingly sharp trade restrictions 
from both the Allied and the Central powers Dutch foreign trade came to a virtual standstill. 
Stocks ran  out, profits plummeted  and  in  1918 production  in  many  industries decreased 
sharply or even came to a total standstill. 
The first six years after World War I show an  unstable picture with large cyclical 
fluctuations in industrial output. The year 1919 witnessed an unbalanced recovery of industrial 
production and  foreign trade. Until  the fall of  1920 optimism about future developments 
prevailed:  industrial production and  investment rose, accompanied by  a sharp increase in 
prices and nominal wages. Because of simultaneous reductions in the number of hours worked 
real hourly wages increased fast. The recession of  the early 1920's revealed many inherent 
weaknesses of  Dutch manufacturing industry. In general, from late  1920 until  1923 prices 
were under pressure without affecting levels of  real output to the same extent. The recession 
primarily squeezed profits.  The tendency  of  decreasing industrial output prices continued 
throughout the  1920's. The period  1924-1929 is referred to in the literature as one of  slow 
progress without an overt urge for expansion and without high  expectation^.^ The literature 
emphasizes the need for firms to cut back costs and raise labour productivity in this period 
in order to remain profitable. 
6  See for instance: A. De Graaff, De industrie. De Nederlandse volkshuishouding tussen twee wereldoorlogen 
8 (Utrecht.  1951); F.A.G. Keesing. De conjuncturele ontwikkelutg van Nederland en de evolutie van de 
economische overheidspolitiek 1918-1939  (Reprint: Nijmegen, 1978). and: R.T Griffiths & J.L.  van Zanden. 
Economische geschiedenis van Nederland in de 2V  eeuw (Utrecht. 1989). 3. Development of value added 
Our estimates of gross output and value added in some branches of industry are based on the 
official production censuses published by the CBS.  Coverage is almost complete for 19 13 and 
1916. The  1919 census covers only certain branches of  industry. From  1921 onwards the 
censuses provide annual data on a number of important industries. Because of problems with 
the coverage and reliability of the census data and their comparability over time, we selected 
a sample comprising 12 major branches of manufacturing industry for our analysis. For these 
12  industries consistent, relatively reliable and comparable figures are  a~ailable.~  Table 2 
presents our calculations of gross value added in current prices. Since we have no estimates 
of capital consumption there is no corresponding estimate of net value added. Therefore, all 
our calculations refer to gross value added. 
Table 2  Nominal value added in  12 branches of industry (million guilders). 














Source: Statistieken van voortbrenging en verbruik, 19 13- 1929 
The most recent estimate of  total value added in Dutch manufacturing for  1921 is  1,452 
million guilders.'  The industries in our sample represent an estimated 20% of industrial value 
added and about 22% of  employment in  1921.9 Our sample is dominated by two very large 
industries: cotton manufacturing and shipbuilding. These two make up 58% of  value added 
and 55% of employment within the sample. 
7  Annex  1  ("bijlage 1")  in the Dutch  version discusses more comprehensively the  issue of  reliability and 
comparibility of the census data. 
8  HJ. de Jong & R.B.M.  Oude Vrielink, 'Produktie en arbeidsproduktiviteit in de voedingsmiddelenindusurie 
1910-1939'. Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarbock 56 (1993)  289-339.292. 
9  Ongevallenstatistiek betreffende de kalenderjaren 1920-1921 (Amsterdam, 1930). 99. The development of  nominal value added is to a large degree determined by  price 
fluctuations. For instance, the general volume of output actually increased between 1921 and 
1929, despite a drop in  value added at current prices.  To calculate real  value added we 
computed industry-specific unit value ratios from the census data for the  most  important 
inputs and outputs. The unit value ratios we used to deflate nominal value added are weighted 
Fisher type indices. The final index (1913=100) was computed by  splicing series with base 
years 1913, 1921, and 1925. We use single deflation, since double deflation in many instances 
yields  highly  volatile  results.  The  period  we  cover  exhibits  large  and  divergent  price 
fluctuations for inputs and outputs. Under these conditions double deflation tends to magnify 
 fluctuation^.'^ We therefore adopted single deflation with output unit value ratios. The tables 
in annex 2 presents value added at current prices, unit value ratios, and real value added for 
industries in our sample. Table 3 reports weighted (by share of  value added) and unweighted 
growth rates of  real value added." 
Table 3  Growth rates of real value added in 12 branches of industry (annual compound growth rate). 














Weighted average  63 
Unweighted average  6,o 
Source:  Statistieken van voortbrenging en  verbruik, 19  13-  1929. 
In our opinion the unweighted figures are to be preferred to the weighted growth rates since 
the latter are dominated by  the cotton and shipbuilding industries. We again emphasize that 
we do not regard our figures representative for the whole secondary sector. Real value added 
in the  12 branches of  industry showed a growth of  5.0 to 6.3% annually between  1913 and 
10  H.H. van Ark. International comparisons of  output and productivity (Groningen,  1993). 38-41. 
11  With the exception of the potato flour and margarine industries, for which we could only calculate physical 
output, due to no consistent prices being available. 1929. This is high compared to yearly GDP growth of  3.6%.12  The growth of  value added 
in agriculture amounted to only 2.1% per annum.13 A second characteristic is the divergence 
in growth patterns of  various industries over time. Performance during World War I was to 
a large degree determined by the availability of raw materials and the development of relative 
prices. Those industries which substituted for imports showed a particularly fast growth during 
the war, often followed by a subsequent decline as trade restrictions were lifted. The rubber 
industry is a good example. The twenties generally show very rapid  growth of industrial 
production. The unweighted growth rate for our sample is 7,2% from 1921 to 1929. This is 
in line with recent estimates of  industrial output in  the twenties, which suggest an  annual 
growth rate of 6 to 7%.14  The weighted growth rate is lower, however, in particular because 
of the stagnation in shipbuilding. In general, those branches of industry which performed best 
during the first World War witnessed a relative decline during the twenties. 
4. Labour productivity 
Our estimates of  labour productivity are based on the computations of  value added. From 
1919 onwards value added by  branch of industry could be matched with figures on labour 
input from the census (Produktiestatistiek)  itself. Unfortunately, the census does not provide 
labour input for 1913 and 1916. For these years we had to resort to using a different source 
which  registrates  man  years  by  branch  of  industry:  the  statistics of  industrial accidents 
(Ongevallenstatistiek).  The  relative  movements  in  employment  according  to  the 
Ongevallenstatistiek were linked to the number of  employees registered in the production 
census in  1919, 1920, or 1921. Despite minor differences in registration between the two 
sources it  proved  possible to  match  them and  splice index  numbers  of  labour input  in 
19  19/192  1. The classification for the industries in  our sample in the  Ongevallenstatistiek 
remained very much the same over the relevant period. Also, the relative movements in the 
number of  employees registered by the two sources showed a very close correlation during 
the 1920's. We therefore conclude that the Ongevallenstatistiek may be used to extrapolate 
relative movements in the number of   employee^.'^ 
The sources discussed so far only register days worked. We rearranged the information 
to calculate labour input in terms of hours worked. In the period we examined allowance for 
hours worked make a crucial difference, since there was a very considerable reduction in the 
length of the working week between 1913 and 1929. This is a characteristic of many Western 
European  countries  in  the  same  period.  If  we  do not  adjust  the  calculations of  labour 
productivity for variations in the length of the working week we seriously underestimate the 
gains  in  productivity. The  number  of  hours  worked  per  person  fust declined gradually 
between 1910 and 1920. In the course of  1920 a very significant further reduction occurred 
as a result of the effectuation of  the 8-hour working day. In reaction to the depression of the 
12  Maddison, Dynamic forces, 2 14. 
13  M. Knibbe, Agriculture in the Netherlands 1851-1950. Production and institutional change (Amsterdam, 
1993). 292. 
14  J.J.  Seegers,  'Produktie  en  concunentievermogen  van  de  Nederlandse  industrie  in  het  Interbellurn', 
Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch  Jaarboek 50 (1  987) 186-21 1, 194. 
15  The matching of the two sources is discussed in more detail in the Dutch annex  1  ("bijlage 1"). of hours worked differed between industries. Table 4 charts the development of the average 
number of  hours worked by branch of  industry.16 













Source: see text 
We  adopted two alternative ways to calculate an index of  labour productivity in terms of 
value added per  unit  of  labour input:  first,  labour productivity (value added) per worker; 
second, labour productivity per hour worked. Graph 1 plots the development of average real 
labour productivity per hour for the  12 industries in our sample. The tables in annex 1 and 
the graphs in annex 2 give a more detailed account of  our figures by  branch of industry. 
16  Figures derived from: Centraal verslag der Arbeidsinspectie in het in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden over 
1911 (z.p. ('s-Gravenhage), 1912). 251-258; F.J.C.  van der Schalk, De wiskundig statistische analyse van 
de arbeidrproductiviteit, (Haarlem, 1938), and: A.F. Heenna van Voss, Kosten van arbeidstijdverkorting. 
De  achturendag in de jaren  twintig (Unpublished PhD-thesis Universitity of Utrecht,  1991). 117,468. Graph  1  Index of unweighted real labour productivity per worker and per hour worked in  12 industries, 191 3-1 929. 
Source: see text. 
+  per  hour worked  ---A-  per worker 
Clearly, labour productivity per hour grows much faster than productivity per worker. The 
large increase in the difference between  1919 and 1921 is mainly due to our recalculation 
allowing for the effects of the shortened working week. At first sight the jump in productivity 
per hour may seem implausibly high, whereas the much more limited increase in productivity 
per  worker  looks  more  credible.  However,  the  very  considerable  increase  in  labour 
productivity per hour is not an artefact of  the data. The scope of our figures for 1919 is more 
limited than for other years, which creates a larger margin of  error. More importantly, the 
picture is distorted because of cyclical fluctuations: 1919 and 1921 are at opposite ends in the 
business-cycle. Furthermore, value added itself shows a large increase in various industries 
between  1919 and  1921, which leaves open the  possibility of  a substantial gain in labour 
productivity. 
To check our estimates of  the development of  labour productivity in terms of  value 
added we also calculated indices of physical labour productivity, which is a more conservative 
measure. The computation of physical productivity was based on quantities of physical output 
(potato flour, margarine, flour, paper, shipbuilding, and shoes) or the consumption of  raw 
materials (cocoa, cotton, rubber, wool, and soap).I7 The trend in physical labour productivity 
may shed some light on the plausibility of a jump in real labour productivity per hour around 
1920. Graph 2 displays the overall development of physical labour productivity. 
17  Based  on  the  sources  mentioned  above  and:  CBS,  'Indexcijfers  van  de productie per  arbeider',  De 
Nederlandsche Conjunctuur (november 1936) 16-1 8. Graph 2 Index of unweighted physical labour productivity per worker and per hour worked (excluding shipbuilding), 
19 13- 1929. Source: see text. 
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+  per hour worked  ---A---  per worker 
Interestingly enough, physical productivity per worker shows a very  low relative level in 
1921, whereas the development of physical productivity per hour (allowing for the changing 
length of the working week) is in line with an average productivity gain of 3%  per annum. 
This supports our opinion that the jump in productivity per hour in terms of value added is 
not a figment of the data. 
A  comparison of  graphs  1 and  2 makes clear that the growth of  physical  labour 
productivity is consistently below the development of value added per unit of labour. How 
can  this  be  explained? In  our  opinion  the  divergence between  real  and  physical  labour 
productivity indicates changes in the production structure. A higher efficiency in the use of 
raw materials is not reflected in estimates of productivity if production is estimated from raw 
material  consumption using  fixed technical coefficients. However, if  we  measure  output 
directly (value added or quantities) the gain in productivity is observed. Growth in physical 
productivity is generally caused by  higher efficiency, for instance the processing of more 
inputs per unit of labour. The difference between the growth rates of physical productivity and 
real productivity signifies structural changes in production processes and supply and demand 
patterns. In general there was a considerable shift towards products with higher value added 
in The Netherlands over the first World War. The changes in the basket of goods produced 
is reflected in a higher growth of real value added compared to output in physical units. This 
observation reinforces the plausibility of a rapid increase in real labour productivity per hour. 
Table 5 shows the development of labour productivity per hour worked by branch of 
industry. Both cross-sectional and cross-time differences can be seen to be substantial. Table 5  Growth rates of real and physical labour productivity per hour (annual compound growth rate). 
Growth rates of real labour productivity per hour by  branch of  industry 














real productivity  5,2 
Total unweighted 
physical productivity  3,o 
Source: Statistieken van voortbrenging en verbruik, 19 13- 1929. Ongevallenstatistiek, 19 13- 192  1. 
An  important general conclusion is that for 7  branches of  industry the rise in productivity 
from 1913 to 1921 was higher than the rise in real value added. This means that labour input 
in  terms  of  total number of  hours  worked had  actually fallen over the  period. The most 
important explanation for this phenomenon is the shorter working week.''  Around 1920 the 
substantial decrease in hours worked was not fully compensated for by a rise in the number 
of workers employed. The considerable reduction in hours worked in 1920 raises the question 
of  productivity offsets. In  general, a productivity increase accompanies shorter hours, an 
argument which already figures in contemporary discussions. There is a also a rich literature 
on the subject. For Dutch industry around  1920 estimates of  the productivity effects of  a 
shorter working week range between 41.5% and 71% on aggregate.I9 These figures may not 
be very accurate. It is clear, however, that these productivity effects have played a major role 
in the growth of labour productivity per hour. 
A puzzle  which  remains  is that  the  most  profound  decrease in  total  labour input 
occurred in the food processing industries, in particular in the cocoa, margarine and flour 
18  Already during the war many firms suffered from a shortage of skilled labour due to rnobilisation. 
19  Heerma van Voss, Arbeidstijdverkorting. 141. P.J. Verdoorn, Arbeidsduur en welvaartspeil (Leiden, 1947), 
165. 242. Verdoom's figures are based on: Van der Schalk. Arbeidsproductiviteit. industries. According to Van der Schalk the effects of shorter hours on productivity in these 
industries were limited because of the high capital intensities. However, Van der Schalk based 
his  calculations  on  physical  indicators,  not  taking  into  account  the  effects  of  rapid 
mechanization and mergers. 
To sum up, real and physical labour productivity levels per hour worked for 1913, 
1916 and  1921 can  be  reconciled  with  a  consistent trend  growth.  On  the  other  hand, 
productivity levels in  1919 are inordinately low, which  is  supposedly due to the  adverse 
circumstances at  the  end  of  the  war.  Our methodology does not  enable us  to  precisely 
distinguish the various driving forces behind the development of  labour productivity.  We 
measure the  net result of  a number of  influences. Around  1920 cyclical effects, shifts in 
production structure, and the effects of  a reduction in hours worked probably all pointed in 
the same direction. 
With reference to our calculations of labour productivity one should bear in mind that 
the figures we present here only pertain to a subset of manufacturing industry. We could not 
include figures on many important 'new industries' in chemicals, electrical engineering and 
metalworking.  Thus  our  figures  do  not  precisely  mirror  developments  in  the  whole  of 
manufacturing.  In  the  remainder  of  this  paper  we  will  focus  on  two  complementary 
determinants of labour productivity which have hitherto received little attention in the Dutch 
literature. In the first place we  will deal with the effects of  an increase in the real cost of 
labour. In the second place we  will pay attention to the significance of  mechanization, in 
particular electrification. 
5. Real wages and labour productivity 
Many industries benefitted from a decline in real wages during the first World War and from 
a  sharp increase of  prices  at  the  end  of  the  war.  From  191811919 onwards real  wages 
increased continuously until 1922, when the real wage level had risen 3 1% compared to 1913. 
The wage increases of  1919 and  the  first half  of  1920 probably did  not pose too  many 
problems. Wages still lagged behind the growth in value added and firms had sizable financial 
reserves.  However,  as  prices  sharply  fell  in  the  summer  of  1920  the  prospects  of 
manufacturing industry rapidly deteriorated. The reduction of the length of the working week 
in  1920 coincided with a rapid increase in real weekly wages (due to falling prices). What 
were the effects on real daily and hourly wages? 
Nominal weekly wages remained the same as hours were reduced. Hourly nominal 
wages  therefore increased by  the  same amount as the  length  of  the  working  week  was 
reduced. In 1920 the average reduction in hours worked amounted to approximately 10%. In 
the industries in our sample the average working week was reduced by  23% between  1913 
and 1921. This is considerably more than the 13% reduction in Great-Britain over the same 
period.*'  By  contrast, the index of  daily real wages (on the basis of  1913=100) increased 
from 84 to  128 between  1918 to 1921.~'  Information on hourly wages is more scarce. We 
estimated an  increase of  the index of  real hourly wages from 83 in  1918 to  154 in  1921 
20  S.N. Broadberry.  'The  emergence of  mass  unemployment: explaining macroeconomic trends  in  Britain 
during the trans-World War  I period', The Economic History Review 43 (1990) 271-282, 276. 
21  P. Schrage, E. Nijhof & P. Wielsma, 'Inkomensontwikkeling van werkenden en  werklozen in Nederland, 
19 13-  1939'. Tijdschrifr voor Sociale Geschiedenis 15  (1 989) 347-394, 380-384. (1913=100).22 
I  To assess the effects of  the development of real  wage for fms  we  computed real 
I  product wages (real wage costs per unit of  production). To this end  we  deflated nominal 
I  wages  with  an  index  of  wholesale  prices,  for  the  moment  without  taking  productivity 
increases into account.23  The index of  the real product wage (1913=100) demonstrates the 
following pattern:  52 in  1918;  154 in  1921, and  172 in  1922. Without  laying too much 
emphasis on the accuracy of  the figures it is clear that the increase in wage costs was very 
considerable. Firms had to come to terms with this rise in labour costs as they sought ways 
to compensate for the decline in labour input due to the reduction in hours worked. Firms 
were  forced  to  take rapid  action  as prices  and  profits  continued to  decline during  1921 
whereas real wages were still on the rise. It proved not possible to completely pass on higher 
labour costs to prices. 
Did the reduction in hours worked and the accompanying rise in real wages constitute 
a major supply shock, as has been argued for the United  Kingdom and ~ermany?~~  If  so, 
were the consequences felt throughout the 192OYs?  The answer to a large extent depends on 
the development of  labour productivity.  It is obvious that  there was  a distributional shift 
towards labour in the first years after the war. But how  large was the productivity offset to 
the fall in hours worked? Real value added per worker in our sample of industry rose by an 
estimated 47%  from  1919 to  1921. Firms reacted  to  the  reduction  in  hours  worked  by 
lessening slack and  changing the  structure of  production  and  sales.  The result  was  that 
marginal labour was not replaced. Verdoorn brought forward a theoretical explanation for the 
very rapid changes during 1920 and beyond. High profits until  1920 meant fms  were not 
forced to increase efficiency. According to Verdoorn the period  1917-1920 is characterized 
by  labour  hoarding  in  anticipation  of  even  better  times  ahead.25 Drastically  lower 
expectations together with the reduction in hours worked led to a rapid adjustment, which 
resulted in a sharp increase in labour productivity. The indices of labour productivity and real 
hourly wages (on the basis of  19  13=100) for 1921 are 156,3 and 154,O respectively. Hence, 
in the short term the productivity offsets were substantial. The impact of  the supply shock 
around 1920 was probably not as dramatic as in the United Kingdom. However, productivity 
gains were not sufficient to fully compensate the continuing rise in real wages and the fall 
in  profits in subsequent years. This resulted in  a tendency to substitute capital for labour 
during the  1920's. The continuing rise in  labour productivity throughout the period under 
study  should  partly  be  ascribed  to  the  direct  influence of  mechanization,  in  particular 
electrification. It is to this issue we turn next. 
22  Based  on  figures  from:  Schrage,  Nijhof  & Wielsma,  'Inkomensontwikkeling', 354-355;  Verdoorn, 
Arbeidsduur, 261, and H.W.  Methorst, 'The cost of living, prices, and wages'  in: The Netherlands and the 
World War Volume II (New Haven, 1928) 303-361, 337.341. 
23  Wholesale prices from:  CBS, Zestig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen (Zeist, 1959).  122. 
24  In  particular J.A. Dowie, '1919-20 is in need of attention', The Economic History Review 23 (1975)  429- 
450, 441. See also: S.N. Broadberry & A. Ritschl, Real wages, productivity and unemployment in Britain 
and  Germany during the 1920's Miinchner Wirtschafstswisscnschaftliche  Beitrilge 92-26 (1992).  1. 
25  Verdoorn. Arbeidsduur. 247. 6. Capital intensity, electrification and productivity 
Gains in  labour' productivity  can  for a  large  part  be  accounted for by  a  rise  in  capital 
inten~ity?~  accompanied by  structural change. Production capacity in the secondary sector 
was substantially expanded during the first years of World War I, in 191911920, and from the 
middle  of  the  twenties  until  the  great  depression.  However,  trends  in  investment  and 
employment did not closely match the development of  the capital stock. Investment boomed 
in the period  1913-1916 and again in 191911920. In both cases this was accompanied by  a 
significant rise in the number of workers in many industries. However, employment lagged 
behind the growth of production capacity in industry after the recession of the early 1920's. 
In our opinion we should distinguish two periods. The first is World War I proper, the second 
the  1920's' with the crucial years immediately after the war serving as a watershed. 
The first World War did not witness large scale substitution of capital for labour in 
Dutch  industry.  Up  to  and  including  1916  all  factors  of  production  were  increased 
simultaneously. Subsequent years were characterized by  labour hoarding and the inability to 
reap the benefits of  large scale investment in previous years. In  the  1920's firms had  to 
improve their prospects by  cutting costs, utilizing economies of  scale, and raising labour 
productivity since prices were continuously under pressure. Profits were modest which limited 
investment  opportunities."  Nevertheless  the  expansion  of  production  capacity  in 
manufacturing industry continued. Employment in manufacturing industry failed to follow 
suit. In the literature the 1920's stand out as a period with an acceleration in mechanization 
and  rationa~ization.?~  These  at  first  sight  conflicting  observations  can  be  reconciled by 
stressing the importance of substitution of capital for labour in this period. In our opinion the 
shock associated with the sudden increase in real wage costs around  1920 played a crucial 
role. The long term effects extended well into the 1920's. 
In order to examine the contribution of mechanization to the development of labour 
productivity in manufacturing industry we  have to study it in more detail. It is difficult to 
exactly trace the progress of mechanization in the secondary sector. Figures about investment 
and capital stocks by branch of industry do not exist for the period we study. The growth of 
the capital stock by branch of industry can be approximated by horsepower  statistic^.'^ Total 
horsepower capacity is subdivided into electrical and non-electric motors. The inclusion of 
electrical motors complicates the applicability of  total horsepower capacity as a measure of 
power capacity used in production. One should distinguish primary electric motors, which are 
powered by  purchased electricity, from secondary electric motors, which  are operated by 
electricity within the firm.  All electric motors drive production machines but  to gauge the 
26  This does not, of course, entail a rise in capital productivity. 
27  Griffiths & Van Zanden, Economische Geschiedenis. 112. J. Tinbergen, 'Kapitaalvorming en conjunctuur 
in Nederland, 1880-1930', De  Nederlandsche Conjunctuur (maart  1932) 8-16. 
28  Keesing, Conjuncturele ontwikkeling, 81-82. In the literature the terms rationaliztion and mechanization are 
often used as if they were freely interchangable. We opt for a clear distinction. We define rationalization 
as  higher  efficiency  in  the  production  process  which  reduces costs,  and  as a  rule  raises joint  factor 
productivity. We reserve the concept of mechanization for substitution of  capital for labour in a more narrow 
sense. Mechanization raises labour productivity but need not be accompanied by an increase in joint factor 
productivity. 
29  R. Minami. Power revolution in the industrialiration of Japan: 1885-1940 (Tokyo. 1987). 7. development of  production capacity one should include only primary motive power.30 We 
use  primary  horsepower  capacity  per  worker  as  an  approximate  measure  of  capital 
intensity."  Primary horsepower per worker in all  industries which the production censuses 
encompasses grew at an annual rate of 2.6% between 1921 and 1929.~'  Table 6 presents the 
development of capital intensity in the paper industry and in shipbuilding. 
Table 6  Development of power capacity in the paper industry and in shipbuilding. 1904-1929. 
PAPER  INDUSTRY 
Horsepower non-electric 
motors (index 1921=100) 
Horsepower secondary electric 
motors (index 1921=100) 
Horsepower primary electric 
motors (index 1921=100) 
Primary power (HP) per worker  2.4  9.8  13.6  11,5 
Electric power (W)  per worker  0,5  8,6  8.7  9,O 
SHIPBUILDING 
Horsepower non-electric 
motors (index  192  1  =  100)  38  100  93 
Horsepower secondary electric 
motors (index 1921=100)  30'  100  92 
Horsepower primary electric 
motors (index 1921=100)  -  100  213 
Primary power (HP) per  worker  0,7  1.7  2,7 
Electric power (HP) per worker  0,3  -  1.5  2.6 
The basic data do not permit to distinguish primary and secondary electric motors in  1904 
Sources:  1904:  Ongevallenstatistiek 
19  19- 1929:  Statistiek van voortbrenging en verbruik 
30  S. Sonenblum, 'Electrification and productivity growth in manufacturing', in:  S.H.  Schurr e.a., Electricity 
in the American economy (New York, 1990) 277-324,288. M. Saitzew, Die Motorenstatistik Ihre Methode 
und  ihre Ergebnisse (Zurich, 1918). 7-8. 
31  R.B.  Du  Boff, 'Electrification and capital productivity:  a suggested approach', Review of Economics and 
Statistics 38 (1966) 426431,428; A.G.  Woolf, Energy and technology in American manufacturing: 1900- 
1929 (PhD-thesis Ann Arbor,  1980). 75. 
32  'Enkele kenmerken van de ontwikkeling der Nederlandsche nijverheid sedert 1921'. Maandschrifr van het 
C.  B.S.  (september  1936)  1333-1  337,  1336.  Tinbergen,  'Kapitaalvorming  en  conjunctuur',  16.  See 
Ongevallenstatistiek 1904 for the only pre-1919 power statistics for individual branches of  industry. The  rapid  growth  of  capital  intensity  over  the  trans-World  War  I  period  is  striking. 
Unfortunately,  this  development  cannot be  reconstructed  on  an  annual basis.  A  second 
important feature is the rapid electrification, which already made significant progress in the 
decade before 1914. Mechanization progressed throughout the 1920's, albeit not at a similar 
pace in every class of industry. Electric power per worker increased more rapidly than total 
horse power, whereas primary electric power comprised a larger and larger share.33  The shift 
towards primary electric motors also implied a shift of generating capacity from firms towards 
electric  utilities.  This  tendency  was  particularly  strong  in  smaller  firms  because  of 
diseconomies of  scale in the generation of ele~tricity.~~ 
We emphasize the key role of  electrification in  understanding the relation between 
mechanization and  the  growth of  labour productivity. We  follow  American  literature in 
stressing that electrification strongly boosted productivity growth and lowered energy intensity 
in manufacturing industry, albeit with a certain lag.35  For the United States the period 1910- 
1920 is regarded as an important divide. The rising trend in both the consumption of energy 
per unit of GDP  and the capital labour ratio was reversed.36 A similar break in the relation 
between energy and output around World  War I has been  suggested for some European 
countries, among them The nether land^.^' We draw a parallel between the United States and 
The Netherlands with regard to electrification and labour productivity. 
The consumption of  energy per unit  of  labour in manufacturing rose at an  annual 
average of  3.8% between  1921 and 1929.~'  This indicates substitution of capital for labour. 
However, energy consumption per horsepower and per unit of output remained more or less 
constant, which implies higher efficiency in the generation and transmission of energy. These 
efficiency gains were connected in particular with the increasing importance of electric power 
in manufacturing. Table 7 illustrates the development of electric power in the secondary sector 
between 1904 and 1930.~' 
Shipbuilding had  an extraordinarily large degree of electrification in  1904. In contrast, only  1% of  total 
horsepower in the cotton industry consisted of electric motors in  1904. 
Woolf, Energy and technology, 47-48. 
S.  Sonenblum, 'Electrification  and  productivity  growth',  277-324;  P.A  David,  'The  dynamo  and  the 
computer:  an historical perspective on the modem productivity paradox',  American Economic Review 80 
(1990) 355-361. 
S. Schurr & B.C.  Netschert, Energy  in  the American  economy. An  economic  study  of  its  history  and 
prospects (Baltimore, 1960). 157-167. S. Sonenblum & S. Schurr, 'Electricity use and energy conservation' 
in: Schurr e.a.,  Electricity  in the American economy 325-339.325-326. Du Boff, 'Electrification and capital 
productivity', 426. 
B.P.A  Gales, 'Mijnbouw', in: H.W.  Lintsen, M.S.C.  Bakker, E.  Homburg e.a. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de 
techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800-1890  IV (Zutphen, 1993) 13-35.14. 
Energy consumption calculated for 21 branches of manufacturing industry for which there is a production 
census. Figures from:  De Graaff, Industrie,  20-23,  29.  Conversion coefficients for electricity from:  B. 
Etemad & J.  Luciani, World energy production  1800-1985 (Gengve,  1991). XXXV  (linear interpolation 
between  1920 and  1931). 
In  the United States the share of primary and secondary electric motors in total power capacity increased 
from 10% in  1903 to 64% in  1929. Schurr e.a., Electricity in the American economy, 394. In The United 
Kingdom these shares were  10% in  1907  10% and  49%  in  1924.  I.C.R.  Byatt.  The British  electrical 
industry, 1875-1914 (Oxford, 1979), 74-76. Table 7  Total power capacity in  industry (horsepower) by  type of engine, 1904-1930. 
Non-electric  Capacity of  Capacity of  Share of ebk 
power capacity  secondary electric  primary electric  motors in total 
(*lo00  HP)  motors (*  1000 HP)  motors (*I000  HP)  power capacity 
Sources:  1904: Ongevallenstatistiek (1  904). 
19 12:  Staatscommissie electrische kracht, 42-45. 
1930: Bedri~telling  1930 deel III, 76-77. 
Primary and secondary electric motors 
Note:  Power capacity in electric utilities has been excluded 
Electric power capacity increased at a much faster rate than total horsepower: mechanization 
meant first and foremost electrification. The significance of ele~~cation  is disguised if only 
the development of  total power capacity is taken into account. Griffiths and Van Zanden, for 
instance, conclude from the slow growth of total horsepower per worker in manufacturing that 
capital  does  little  to  explain  the  gains  in  labour  productivity.'  However,  they  fail  to 
distinguish between electric and non-electric motive power. In this way, they disregard the 
capital saving bias of electrification, which enabled production to grow at a much faster rate 
than capital inputs?'  Technological progress embodied by  electrification made  it possible 
to use capital, labour, and energy more efficiently. New methods of power transmission and 
distribution often reduced the cost of  equipping p~ant."~  The effects on labour productivity 
were pr~found.~'  The strong capital saving bias of  electrification thus may  help to explain 
the  comparatively low level of investment in the 1920's. The same point has been made for 
Great Britain, where investment also seemed paradoxically low compared with the growth of 
production during the twentie~.~ 
40  Gtiffiths & Van Zanden, Econornische geschiedenis, 118. 
4  1  Sonenblum, 'Electrification and productivity growth',  298. 
42  W.D. Devine Jr., 'Electrified mechanical drive: the historical power distribution revolution'  in: Schurr e.a., 
Electricity in the American economy 21-42,  30,  36-38;  David, 'Dynamo and computer', 358. 
43  Minarni, Power revolution, chapters 8-13  provides excellent material on the level of  individual industries. 
44  R.C.O.  Matthews, C.H. Feinstein & LC. Odling-Smee, British economic growth, 1856-1973 (Oxford, 1982), 
382-385. 7. Conclusions 
The  trans-World  War  I  period  has  shown  significant  changes  in  the  development  of 
manufacturing industry in The Netherlands. In our opinion the period immediately after the 
war deserves thorough investigation since many profound changes with long term structural 
effects occurred in the aftermath of the First World War. From a sample of twelve industries 
we infer a marked acceleration in labour productivity in Dutch manufacturing. We emphasize 
two possible explanations. First, a drastic reduction in hours worked accompanied by a shock 
in real wage costs around 1920. In our view this sparked off substitution of capital for labour, 
which was  an  important characteristic of Dutch  manufacturing in  the  1920's.  Second, in 
contrast with the historiography, we  state that  investment, electrification in particular, did 
contribute prominently to the growth in labour productivity. A trend towards mechanization 
had  already  set  in  before  World  War  I.  The capital  saving  tendencies  associated  with 
electrification were of particular importance. This enabled a reduction in non-labour costs 
which partly compensated for the rise in real wages. These preliminary conclusions cannot 
be more than a fxst attempt to emphasize factors that were underrated in previous accounts. 
This needs to be followed up by more detailed research on the level of individual industries. Annex 1:  Real value added, labour input, real labour productivity, and unit value ratios 
by branch of industry. Sources: Produktiestatistiek, Ongevallenstatistiek. 
Cocoa 19 13- 1929 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Yuu  Numkrof  Valueof  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of real  Index of labour 
companies  inputs  gross output  value ratio  labour input  value added  produaivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=100  1913-100  1913=100  1913r100 Cotton 19 13-1929 
Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  In&x  of real  Indcx of labour 
companies  inputs  gross output  value ratio  labour input  value ad&d  productivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=1W  1913=1W  1913=1W  1913=100 
Flour  1913-1929 
Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of nal  In&x  of labour 
companies  inputs  gross  output  value ratio  labour input  value added  productivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913-100  1913=100  1913=1W  1913=100 Paper 1913-1929 
Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  gros  Output unit  Index of  Index of  real  Index of  labour 
companies  inputs  output  value ratio  labour input  value added  productivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100  1913-100 
Shipbuilding 19 13- 1929 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of  labour 
companies  inputs  gross output  value ratio  labour input  productivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100 
' Produaion in  1913 calculated from physical indicators provided by  Van dcr Schalk, Arbeidsproduktivireir. bijlage 11.  8-9. 
Intermediate inputs in  1916 estimated by  the  ratio to gross output in  1920 and  1921. Shoes 1913-1929 
Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of Ral  Index of labour 
companies  inputs  gross output  value ratio  labour input  value added  productivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100 
Knitted goods 1913-1929 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of Ral  Index of labour 
companies  inputs  gross output  value ratio  labour input  value added  productivity 
in census  mln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100 
Calculated from physical indicators Year  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of ml  Index of labour 
companies  inputs  gross output  value ratio  labour input  value added  productivity 
in census  mh.  gld.  mln gld.  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100 
Soap  1913-1929 
Ycar  Number of  Value of  Value of  Output unit  Index of  Index of ml  Index of labour 
companies  inputs  grossoutput  valueratio  labourinput  valueadded  productivity 
in census  rnln. gld.  mln. gld.  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100  1913=100 Annex 2:  Growth rates of real value added and real labour productivity per hour worked 
in 12 branches of industry 
Real value added and labour productivity per hour in 12 branches of  industry 
Annual compound growth rates, 1921  -1  929 
Real value added and labour productivity per hour in 12 branches of industry 
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